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In August 2020, we wrote on the massive job loss in the 
United States over the early stages of the COVID-19 
pandemic and the racial/ethnic and gender dispari-
ties in job recovery.1 From February to June 2020 the 
United States had experienced a net loss of more than 
15 million workers, but the declines were greater 
among women than men (11.2 percent compared to 
7.9 percent), and greater for Blacks (11.5 percent) and 
Latinos (12.3 percent) than for Whites (7.5 percent). 
A lot has happened since then. The latest unemploy-
ment picture (see Figure 4 below) still shows that Blacks 
have an unemployment rate nearly two times higher 
and Latinos 1.5 times higher than Whites. The relative 
unemployment rankings of these groups mimic those of 
the pre-COVID period, but jobless rates for all groups 
remain higher than they were prior to the pandemic.
This policy brief provides an update on the employ-
ment trends that took place between February 2020 
and June 2021. Our analysis focuses on the change in 
the number of persons with a job as well as on the great 
changes that have occurred in the size of the civilian 
labor force and the levels of unemployment. We further 
contrast the employment patterns of U.S. workers 
through comparisons across gender, racial/ethnic, and 
educational lines, and, for Latinos, nativity status. The 
analysis subsequently highlights disparities in the abil-
ity to work from home during the pandemic and varia-
tions in the fortunes and woes of the U.S. workforce.
Our analysis shows much change in certain 
respects and some continuities concerning employ-
ment patterns. Some groups of individuals have 
surpassed the employment levels they had before 
the plunge of the economy in the spring of 2020, 
other groups are getting close to that level, and other 
groups are further below their job levels of that time. 
However, one thing is certain: the attainment of or 
close proximity to regaining the employment level 
of February 2020 does not necessarily translate to 
low unemployment rates in June 2021. Such seeming 
contradictions reflect the changes that have occurred 
in the civilian population 16 and older over the 16 
months to June 2021. There has been much move-
ment in and out of the civilian labor force since the 
pandemic. Many persons have had to leave the labor 
FIGURE 1. TOTAL NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
Box 1: Defining Unemployment 
To understand how the pandemic has affected joblessness in the United States, it is 
important to understand the technical definition of unemployment. Calculations 
begin with the civilian working-age population, i.e., those 16 years of age and 
older, which as of June 2020 was 265.5 million. (Note that in our analysis, we focus 
on the civilian labor force, thus excluding workers who are part of the military.) 
The civilian working-age population falls into two distinct groups: those partici-
pating in the labor force (162.7 million as of June 2020) and those not participat-
ing (102.8 million). The labor force participation rate is computed by dividing 
the number of working-age people participating in the civilian labor force by the 
total working-age population. In June 2020 that share was 61.3 percent (162.7 mil-
lion divided by 265.5 million).
The unemployed are part of the 
labor force; though they are not 
currently working, they are actively 
pursuing work. The unemploy-
ment rate is calculated by dividing 
the number of people who are 
currently not working but actively 
looking for work (10.1 million in 
June 2020) by the total population 
in the civilian labor force (162.7 
million). This share—the unem-
ployment rate—was 6.2 percent in 
June 2020. The complement to the 
unemployment rate is the employ-
ment rate, which is obtained by 
dividing the number of people who are currently working (152.6 million) by the 
total population in the civilian labor force. This share was 93.8 percent in June 2020.
force to take care of children or 
address other familial responsi-
bilities, some have lost their jobs, 
some have found jobs, and still 
others have opted for retirement. 
Sadly, many others who were 
part of the civilian labor force in 
February 2020 are no longer with 
us—more than 653,000 persons in 
the United States have died due to 
COVID-19 as of this writing.
The Big Picture
There have been significant 
improvements in the number of 
individuals holding a job since 
the job plunge in April 2020, 
when there were 25 million fewer 
workers than two months earlier. 
Nonetheless, employment has not 
recovered, as there were still 5.9 
million fewer people with a job in 
June 2021 than in February 2020 
(Figure 1), a drop of 3.7 percent.
The full employment panorama, 
however, shows that the number of 
people who are unemployed soared 
59 percent between February 2020 
and June 2021, and participation 
in the civilian labor force plunged 
by 2.1 million persons, a drop of 
1.3 percent, during this period. In 
fact, as these individuals dropped 
out of the labor force, they contrib-
uted to the expansion of 3.8 million 
persons 16 and older who were not 
part of the labor force over those 16 
months. The growth of persons not 
in the civilian labor force was dis-
proportionately among those who 
retired: 92 percent of the 3.8 million 
who left the labor force retired.
All told, the nation’s unemploy-
ment rate stood at 6.2 percent in 
June 2021 compared to 3.9 percent 
in February 2020. Underlying this 
top-line number is much variation in 
job loss and changes in the civilian 
labor force along race/ethnic, gender, 
and, for Latinos, nativity lines. 
Segmentation of Working-Age Population Into Key 
Labor Market Components Referred to in Text
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FIGURE 2. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS BY GENDER,  
FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
Many Fewer Women With a 
Job and in the Labor Force
Job recovery varies tremendously 
along gender lines. There were 5.1 
percent fewer employed women in 
June 2021 than in February 2020 
and 2.4 percent fewer employed 
men, meaning that women were 
more than twice as likely as men to 
have had a job in February 2020 but 
to lack one (whether through unem-
ployment or by leaving the labor 
force) in June 2021 (Figure 2). 
Not only were there inordinately 
fewer women with a job, but they 
were much more likely than men to 
leave the civilian labor force—that 
is, they currently do not have a job 
and they are not actively seeking one. 
Indeed, 61 percent of women who no 
longer have a job were no longer part 
of the labor force in June 2021 com-
pared to 19 percent of men. Thus, 
there were 4.5 women who were no 
longer in the labor force in June 2021 
for each one man who had made the 
exit. This disparity clearly illustrates 
the gendered impact of the pandemic 
on work activity.
Other barometers point to the 
disadvantaged position of women in 
the workforce compared to men. For 
example, between February 2020 and 
June 2021, the number of unemployed 
soared by 78 percent for women 
compared to 45 percent for men, the 
number of persons not in the labor 
force rose by 1.4 percent for women 
and declined by 0.6 percent for men, 
and the number of retired persons 
increased by 7.8 percent for women 
compared to 6.7 percent for men. 
The greater decline of women in 
the civilian labor force needs to be 
taken into account in making sense 
of unemployment rates of women 
and men. In June 2021, women (6.3 
percent unemployment) and men 
(6.2 percent) essentially had the same 
level of unemployment. In this regard, 
the unemployment rate of women 
looks comparable to that of men, but 
it hides the large number of women 
who have exited the labor force and 
are no longer counted in the compu-
tation of the unemployment rate.
A Paradox: Fewer Whites 
With Jobs, But Higher 
Unemployment Among 
Blacks and Latinos
In our brief on this subject last year, 
we described how workers of color 
were particularly hard hit during the 
early phases of the pandemic. Now, 
the number of persons holding a 
job have significantly shifted across 
racial/ethnic lines. There were 4 
percent fewer White workers in June 
2021 than in February 2020 com-
pared to lower declines among Blacks 
(-2.6 percent) and Latinos (-3.6 per-
cent) (Figure 3). Whites accounted 
for two-thirds of the decline of 5.9 
million workers over the 16 months 
to June 2021, Latinos for 17 percent, 
Blacks for 8 percent, and all other 
racial groups for 8 percent. 
Despite the more favorable 
employment trends of Blacks and 
Latinos compared to Whites, the 
lower unemployment rates of Whites 
found earlier persist in June 2021. 
The unemployment rate for Blacks 
was 9.7 percent, 1.9 times higher 
than the rate for Whites (5 percent); 
for Latinos the 7.5 percent unem-
ployment rate was 1.5 times higher 
than that for Whites (Figure 4).
What accounts for this paradox, a 
more favorable job situation among 
Blacks and Latinos but more unfa-
vorable levels of unemployment 
compared to Whites? The primary 
explanation is that there has been a 
greater tendency for Whites to leave 
the labor force than for Latinos and 
Blacks. The number of Whites in 
the civilian labor force dropped by 
2.1 percent between February 2020 
and June 2021 compared to a dip of 
0.9 percent among Latinos; Blacks 
actually experienced a growth of 1 
percent in the labor force. The labor 
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FIGURE 3. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS BY RACE/ETHNICITY, 
FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
FIGURE 4. PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED BY RACE/
ETHNICITY, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
force exit of Whites is dominated 
by the growth of 2.2 million in the 
White retiree population, which 
rose by 6 percent between February 
2020 and June 2021—a growth rate 
2.6 times higher than that expe-
rienced in similar length periods 
before the pandemic (e.g., the retiree 
population grew 2.3 percent between 
February 2018 and June 2019). Still, 
despite the absolute numbers being 
much smaller, the retiree popula-
tions of Latinos (13.9 percent) and 
Blacks (9.7 percent) grew at a swifter 
pace than that of Whites over the 16 
months to June 2021.
Rising Employment for 
Men of Color, Worse for 
Women Across the Board
The more favorable employment 
situation of Latinos and Blacks, 
however, occurred only for men. 
Between February 2020 and June 
2021, the number of Black men with 
a job inched upward by 1 percent, 
while that of Latino men dropped 
by 1.8 percent, less than the decline 
of 3.1 percent of Whites (Figure 5). 
In contrast, women have fared much 
worse across racial/ethnic groups: 5.9 
percent fewer Latina women had a 
job in June 2021 than 16 months ear-
lier, 5.7 percent fewer Black women, 
and 5 percent fewer White women.
The brighter job position of Black 
and Latino men is due, in part, to 
their rising labor market activity. 
Between February 2020 and June 
2021, 4.1 percent more Black men 
and 0.3 percent more Latino men 
were in the civilian labor force. The 
other four subgroups experienced 
declines in their labor force tallies: 
-2.6 percent for White women, -2.3 
percent for Latina women, -1.7 
percent for Black women, and -1.6 
percent for White men.
The significant growth of persons 
who have retired occurred across all 
groups during the pandemic. Among 
White women 1.2 million retired over 
the 16-month period, accounting for 
about one-third of persons who have 
made this decision; White men (1 mil-
lion retirees) accounted for another 
one-fourth. However, the pace of 
growth in the retirement popula-
tion has been especially high among 
Latina and Black women. There are 
now 427,000 more Latina women and 
315,000 more Black women who are 
retired compared to before the pan-
demic, a rate of growth of 18.8 percent 
and 12.3 percent, respectively.
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FIGURE 5. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS BY RACE/ETHNICITY 
AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
FIGURE 6. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED LATINA/OS BY NATIVITY AND 
GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
More Native-Born Latino 
Workers, Fewer Foreign 
Born
Latinos born in the United States tend 
to fare better socioeconomically than 
those born outside of this country. We 
observe this when it comes to trends 
in employment over the 16-month 
period reviewed here, when native-
born Latino men and Latina women 
did much better than their immigrant 
counterparts. While native-born 
Latino men experienced a bump of 1 
percent in persons having a job, there 
were 4.6 percent fewer employed 
foreign-born men. Among women, 
the nativity gap was even wider with 
4.3 percent fewer U.S.-born women 
working compared to 8.3 percent 
fewer foreign-born women (Figure 
6). No other group examined here 
has sustained such a great plunge in 
employment as have Latina immi-
grant women, the closest being Black 
women, who experienced a decline in 
employment of 5.7 percent. 
This nativity divide concerning the 
job fortunes of Latinos reflects, in 
part, the distinct population growth 
rates of U.S.- and foreign-born 
Latinos due to age structure and 
immigration trends. The native-born 
civilian labor force, which includes 
the U.S.-born children of immi-
grants, is quite young, with a median 
age of 32 in June 2021; the median 
age of the foreign-born labor force is 
44. In addition, over the last decade 
immigration has slowed significantly, 
particularly among those originating 
from Mexico,2 and it came to a halt 
during the pandemic. Thus, between 
February 2020 and June 2021, the 
native-born Latino civilian popula-
tion 16 and older rose by 4.2 percent, 
as these young Latinos reached 
working age, while the foreign-born 
Latino civilian population remained 
virtually unchanged, with a 0.1 
percent increase, as few newcom-
ers arrived. These disparate growth 
trends were already afoot prior to 
the pandemic: between February 
2018 and June 2019, the native-born 
Latino civilian population 16 and 
older increased by 5.0 percent, while 
that of the foreign born dipped by 
0.1 percent.
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FIGURE 7. PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED BY RACE/
ETHNICITY AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
FIGURE 8. PERCENT OF LATINA/O CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED 
BY NATIVITY AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
Unemployment Still a 
Reality for Workers of 
Color 
Despite the favorable trend concern-
ing more Black men and native-
born Latino men working now than 
prior to the pandemic, Black and 
Latino men and women have higher 
unemployment rates compared to 
Whites (Figure 7). White women 
(4.9 percent) and men (5.1 percent) 
had the lowest unemployment rates 
in June 2021, while Black men (10.3 
percent), Black women (9.2 percent), 
and Latina women (8.8 percent) had 
the highest. 
Higher Joblessness 
Among U.S.-Born Latinos 
Than Immigrants
Another seeming anomaly is that, 
despite more favorable trends regard-
ing employment among native-born 
Latinos compared to their immi-
grant counterparts, Latina women 
(9.7 percent) and Latino men (8.3 
percent) born in the United States 
have higher unemployment rates 
than their immigrant counterparts 
(Figure 8). Foreign-born Latino men 
have the lowest jobless rate at 4.4 
percent. These trends are consistent 
with those we observed a year ago, 
although at that time immigrant 
women had higher unemployment 
levels than U.S.-born women.
The College Diploma 
Divide
There are clearly two worlds associ-
ated with how well U.S. workers 
have fared in the pandemic. While 
those with at least a bachelor’s 
degree have generally been able 
to keep their jobs, the situation is 
much more precarious among those 
who do not have a college diploma. 
This segment of the analysis focuses 
on persons 25 and older, the group 
that the U.S. Census Bureau uses in 
the computation of overall educa-
tional attainment levels.
The number of persons without 
a college diploma who had a job 
dropped by 6.1 percent between 
February 2020 and June 2021, a 
decline that is more than twice as 
high as that for individuals with a 
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FIGURE 9. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS 25 AND OLDER BY 
EDUCATION LEVEL, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
FIGURE 10. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED PERSONS 25 AND OLDER BY 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO 
JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
bachelor’s degree or higher (2.6 per-
cent) (Figure 9). Notably, 6.4 million 
fewer persons 25 and older had a job 
in June 2021 than in February 2020. 
Of these persons who no longer had 
a job, three-fourths were persons who 
are not college graduates, although 
they made up only 58 percent of the 
civilian labor force in February 2020.
Less-educated persons were also 
more likely to exit the civilian labor 
force than were their more-educated 
counterparts (declining 3.5 percent 
and increasing 1.0 percent, respec-
tively) over the 16-month period. The 
retirement option appears to be more 
common among the more educated: 
the number of retirees increased by 
11 percent between February 2020 
and June 2021 among this group, 
nearly twice as high as the percent 
increase among persons without a 
college diploma (5.8 percent). 
The unemployment rate of people 
without a bachelor’s degree stood at 
6.8 percent in June 2021, almost twice 
as high as that of persons with a bach-
elor’s degree or higher (3.6 percent).
The Worsening Job 
Situation of Less-Educated 
Women and Black Men 
With a College Degree
However, among persons with lower 
levels of education, it is women 
across the board who have been par-
ticularly hard hit (Figure 10), with 
upward of 9 percent fewer having a 
job in June 2021 than in February 
2020 (specifically, a decline of 9.9 
percent for Black women, 9.4 percent 
for White women, and 9 percent for 
Latinas). Less-educated White men 
(-6.1 percent) lag behind Black (+8.1 
percent) and Latino (-2.4 percent) 
men, with fewer having a job in 
June 2021 than 16 months earlier. 
Women (White, -6.8 percent; Latina, 
-5.7 percent; Black, -4.9 percent) 
and White men (-4.6 percent) with 
less education have also experienced 
greater exit rates from the civil-
ian labor force. On the other hand, 
there were 11.8 percent more Black 
men without a college diploma who 
were part of the labor force in June 
2021 than in February 2020. Less-
educated Latino men are also close to 
breaking even, with 0.9 percent fewer 
being in the labor force now than 
prior to the pandemic.
Overall, persons with college 
diplomas have fared much bet-
ter, with Latino men (0.8 percent) 
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FIGURE 11. PERCENT OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE 25 AND OLDER UNEMPLOYED 
BY EDUCATION LEVEL, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO 
JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
FIGURE 12. PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYED LATINA/OS 25 AND OLDER BY 
EDUCATION LEVEL, NATIVITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
and Latina women (0.3 percent) 
experiencing increasing employ-
ment in June 2021 than 16 months 
earlier. Latina women (4.5 percent) 
and Latino men (3.0 percent) also 
posted a rise in their participation 
in the civilian labor force. More-
educated Black men, however, rep-
resent the anomaly. One-fifth fewer 
of them had a job in June 2021 
compared to February 2020.
People of Color Continue 
to Suffer From Higher Un-
employment, Regardless 
of Educational Level
Across educational levels and gender, 
Whites had the lowest unemploy-
ment rates in June 2021. White men 
and White women registered the low-
est jobless rates, whether they had less 
education (5.5 percent unemploy-
ment) or more (just over 3 percent) 
(Figure 11). In fact, Black men and 
Latina women with a college diploma 
are more likely to be unemployed 
than White men and women who do 
not have a college degree. Among all 
categories, Black men (11.3 percent), 
Black women (10 percent), and 
Latina women (8.3 percent) had the 
highest rates of unemployment. For 
Black men with less education, their 
significant gains in the labor force 
and jobs did not translate to lower 
unemployment levels.
Varying Employment 
Trends of Native- and 
Foreign-Born Latinos
Employment change has varied 
tremendously among Latinos once 
we account for nativity status, edu-
cational level, and gender (Figure 
12). The subgroups examined here 
can be grouped into three categories 
based on their employment trends 
over the course of the 16 months to 
June 2021. The first category consists 
of those who were working more in 
June 2021 than in February 2020: 
native-born Latino men (an increase 
of 11.3 percent) and Latina women 
(4.1 percent) with a college diploma. 
The second category includes groups 
with a slight decline in persons hold-
ing jobs between February 2020 and 
June 2021: foreign-born (-1.9 per-
cent) and native-born (-3.0 percent) 
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FIGURE 13. PERCENT OF LATINA/O CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE 25 AND OLDER 
UNEMPLOYED BY EDUCATION LEVEL, NATIVITY, AND GENDER, FEBRUARY 2020 
TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
Latino men with a college degree 
are close to equalizing their percent-
ages with a job 16 months earlier. 
The third category consists of groups 
that have fared the worst, with much 
lower percentages of persons having 
a job now than before the pandemic: 
fewer foreign-born men with a col-
lege diploma (-12.8 percent), foreign-
born (-9.7 percent) and native-born 
women (-8.2 percent) without a 
college diploma, and foreign-born 
women with a college diploma (-6.4 
percent) had a job in June 2021 than 
in February 2020.
Four groups stand out with respect 
to significant changes in the size of 
the civilian labor force. Native-born 
Latino men (14.4 percent) and Latina 
women (8.4 percent) with college 
degrees have experienced significant 
increases in their participation in 
the civilian labor force; foreign-born 
Latino men with a college diploma 
(-11.5 percent) and foreign-born 
Latina women with lower levels of 
education (-9.7 percent) have sus-
tained major declines in the civilian 
labor force.
The unemployment rates in June 
2021 vary significantly as well. 
College-educated Latino men (for-
eign born, 3 percent; native born, 
3.5 percent) have the lowest levels of 
unemployment (Figure 13). In con-
trast, native-born Latina women with 
lower levels of education (9.7 percent) 
and foreign-born Latina women with 
a college degree (8.5 percent) have 
the highest jobless rates.
Who Gets to Work From 
Home?
In March 2020, in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic and following 
shutdowns across the United States, 
many employees moved to telework-
ing. At first seen as a temporary 
measure, working from home soon 
became a new normal for those 
employed in occupations that did not 
require personal contact and physi-
cal presence at the workplace. More 
than one year since the onset of the 
pandemic, a large segment of the 
workforce is still engaged in remote 
work. Despite all the challenges asso-
ciated with shifting to working from 
home (technological issues, blurred 
boundaries between work and per-
sonal life, child care responsibilities, 
and so forth), teleworking allowed 
workers to keep their employment 
and minimized health risks through-
out the pandemic. 
The wide inequalities in job loss 
and recovery that have dispropor-
tionately hit the most disadvantaged 
demographic groups are in part 
associated with the ability to work 
remotely.3 More-educated, high-
income professionals engaged in 
occupations that require greater 
reliance on technology embraced the 
opportunity of working from home, 
while the rest of the labor force suf-
fered from job losses or continued to 
perform essential and frontline jobs 
bearing high health risks. Racial/
ethnic and educational divisions in 
teleworking echo the disparities in 
unemployment rates and labor force 
exits described above.
In this part of the analysis, we 
compare the percent of employ-
ees working from home during 
the May 2020–June 2021 period 
across racial/ethnic, gender, and 
educational-attainment categories. 
Figure 14 demonstrates the overall 
racial disparities in the opportunity 
to work remotely. Throughout the 
13 months, Whites were more likely 
to work from home than Blacks 
and Latinos. The gap between 
Whites and Latinos is particularly 
pronounced: around 15 percent of 
White workers were still working 
from home in June 2021 compared 
to less than 10 percent of Latinos.
Gender comparisons across all 
three racial/ethnic groups reveal 
that women have been more likely 
to telework during the pandemic 
than men (Figure 15). We believe 
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FIGURE 14. PERCENT OF U.S. EMPLOYEES WHO WORKED FROM HOME, BY 
RACE/ETHNICITY, MAY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
FIGURE 15. PERCENT OF U.S. WORKERS WHO WORKED FROM HOME BY RACE/
ETHNICITY AND GENDER, MAY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
that in this case the gender gap 
does not point to a more privileged 
position of women in the labor 
market (in terms of occupations 
and skills), but rather reflects the 
fact that women were forced to turn 
to teleworking to fulfill child care 
responsibilities. Yet again, across 
genders, Whites have the advantage 
over other racial/ethnic groups 
in terms of being able to perform 
their jobs from home, meaning that 
despite these child care responsibili-
ties many women of color and those 
with lower levels of education were 
unable to work from home.
Our findings, however, show that 
the highest disparities in telework-
ing are associated with educational 
differences (Figure 16). Workers 
holding at least a bachelor’s degree 
are the most privileged with 
respect to teleworking: the per-
cent of Whites with a bachelor’s 
degree working from home was 
as high as 60 percent in May 2020 
and decreased to 30 percent in 
May 2021; for Black and Latino 
workers with a bachelor’s degree 
the percent working remotely was 
lower. The remote work patterns 
for the least-educated group depict 
a very different picture: the per-
cent of remote workers across all 
races and ethnicities in this group 
never exceeded 10 percent. That 
racial/ethnic gaps in working 
remotely decrease once popula-
tions are stratified by education 
suggests that overall racial/ethnic 
differences are highly correlated 
with differences in educational 
attainment. Race and ethnicity 
differences are only visible for the 
highly educated group, reflecting 
the proposition that education does 
not translate into occupational 
prestige and status at the same rate 
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FIGURE 16. PERCENT OF U.S. WORKERS WHO WORKED FROM HOME BY 
RACE/ETHNICITY AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, MAY 2020 TO JUNE 2021
Source: IPUMS CPS Monthly Data. Calculations by Corey S. Sparks, PhD.
for all racial/ethnic groups. That is, 
that even highly-educated persons 
of color are unable to work from 
home points to smaller protective 
effects of educational attainment 
for persons of color. Racial/ethnic 
differences in work-from-home 
patterns can be better understood 
in line with other empirical studies 
in the field of racial disparities that 
demonstrate the existence of racial/
ethnic gaps in wages, occupational 
prestige, wealth, and health among 
highly educated workers.4 Deeper 
structural causes could be the con-
tributing factors for the racial/eth-
nic disparities: job segregation due 
to labor market discrimination, 
residential segregation (by reduc-
ing the quality of education and 
occupation), and vertical mismatch 
between the individual’s educa-
tional level and education require-
ments for the occupation (highly 
educated people of color are chan-
neled into mismatched jobs).5 
Conclusions and Policy 
Implications
In our earlier analysis of the U.S. job 
situation in the beginning stages of 
the pandemic, we discovered that 
women and persons of color were 
disproportionately impacted by 
tremendous levels of job loss, and 
they lagged significantly behind 
men and Whites, respectively, in 
their level of job recovery. Our 
updated analysis reveals that, 
while the employment situation 
has improved noticeably since the 
economic abyss of the shutdown of 
the economy in April 2020, we are 
still a long way from job recovery.6 
Further, as we observed about a year 
ago, women and people of color 
continue to be the furthest removed 
from job recovery. We also showed 
that unemployment rates need to 
be considered alongside the major 
declines in the number of persons 
in the civilian labor force and those 
holding a job. Finally, demographic 
groups who were able to work from 
home—disproportionately White 
and more-educated workers—have 
fared much better than those who 
did not have this safety net.
Our findings have important 
policy implications for the short- and 
long-term as, and after, the pandemic 
recedes. Many people are still without 
employment due to the loss of jobs 
that have not yet returned, the obliga-
tions they have for child care and 
elder care, and other situations. Many 
are on the verge of losing their homes 
as eviction bans expire. Many families 
continue to face hunger.7 There is a 
major need for the creation of policy 
to ensure that people have their basic 
necessities met and that they are 
able to make necessary adjustments, 
including job retraining, to begin the 
process of rebuilding their lives in the 
coming months and years. President 
Biden’s infrastructure bills would be 
particularly helpful in putting to work 
many people who desperately need 
jobs today. Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal represents a model for rebuild-
ing and sustaining our country, our 
workers, and our people. 
Furthermore, as numerous indus-
tries face job shortages, it is impor-
tant that policymakers craft policies 
that support workers on the mar-
gins who for too long have endured 
the lack of basic benefits including 
sick leave, health insurance, decent 
wages, parental leave, and affordable 
child care. Given a major slowdown 
in U.S. population growth brought 
about by aging, alongside the reduc-
tion of fertility and immigration 
aggravated by the pandemic, there 
will be an increasing demand for 
workers following the pandemic. 
The competitiveness of businesses 
will increasingly be tied to investing 
in their workforces. 
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Put simply, more than ever we will need creative 
policies that prioritize the needs of all Americans 
and especially those who have for too long been 
relegated to the margins. There is a profound need 
for bold solutions that change the status quo that 
has recreated inequality and heightened risks for our 
most vulnerable citizens.
Methodology
Monthly Current Population Survey microdata 
are from the Integrated Public Microdata Series, 
IPUMS–CPS.8 Data are subset to contain only those 
respondents in the civilian labor force 16 years of 
age and older. All estimates are weighted by the 
WTFINL variable to be representative of the U.S. 
labor force. No statistical testing was done; all esti-
mates presented are population-weighted means, so 
intergroup comparisons may not have statistical sig-
nificance. A minimum sample size of 30 respondents 
for each population subgroup, per month, was used 
to avoid statistically unstable estimates. The race/
ethnicity variable created here is a combination of 
both the self-reported race and Hispanic/Latino eth-
nicity of the respondent. Latino/a ethnicity includes 
all respondents who reported Hispanic/Latino 
ethnicity, regardless of race; Whites include non-
Hispanic White respondents; and Blacks include 
non-Hispanic Black respondents. Unfortunately, 
sample sizes were relatively small for other racial 
groups. All data and code related to this brief are 
available at Dr. Corey Sparks’s Github repository 
github.com/corey_sparks/unemployment. 
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